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Abstract
Composing a team of professional players is among the most crucial decisions in as-
sociation football. Nevertheless, transfer market decisions are often based on myopic
objectives and questionable from a financial point of view. This paper introduces a chance-
constrained model to provide analytic support to club managers during transfer windows.
The model seeks a top-performing team while adapting to different budgets and financial-
risk profiles. In addition, it provides a new rating system that is able to numerically reflect
the on-field performance of football players and thus contribute to an objective assessment
of football players. The model and rating system are tested on a case study based on real
market data. The data from the case study are available online for the benefit of future
research.
Keywords: association football, team composition, sport, sports management, stochastic
programming, integer programming
1 Introduction
Composing a team of players is among the most crucial decisions a football club’s manager
is required to make. In fact, the main component of a football club’s costs is expenditure on
players, through both wages and transfer fees (Dobson and Goddard, 2001). However, the
analysis performed by Kuper and Szymanski (2018) illustrates that transfer decisions are often
based on myopic objectives, impulsive reactions, and are overly influenced by factors such as
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recent performances (Lewis, 2004), particularly in big tournaments, nationality, and even hair
color. With few exceptions, football clubs are in general bad business, rarely making profits
and most often accumulating considerable debts. The authors explain that poor management
of football clubs is tolerated because, unlike in most industries, clubs in practice never go
bankrupt. History shows that creditors rarely claim their credits to the extent of causing the
default of the club. In other words: “no bank manager or tax collector wants to say: The
century-old local club is closing. I am turning off the lights” (Kuper and Szymanski, 2018). In
practice, clubs eventually find someone who bails them out, change management, narrow the
budget, and forces them to restart by competing at lower standards (e.g., being relegated).
According to UEFA, this dramatic scenario is changing for the better. In their Club
Licensing Benchmarking Report for the financial year 2016 (UEFA, 2018), UEFA reports that
the combined debt of Europe’s top-division clubs (which includes net loaning and net player
transfer balance) has decreased from 60% of revenue in 2010 to 35% of revenue in 2016,
partially as a consequence of the introduction of UEFA Financial Fair Play rules. In addition,
the report shows that profits are also increasing, generating resources to be reinvested in the
football business, e.g., to reinforce the team. Furthermore, a number of football clubs are
listed in stock exchanges (see, KPMG (2017)), with the notable case of Juventus FC entering
the FTSE-MIB index which tracks the performance of the 40 main shares in the Italian stock
market (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2018; Vanguard, 2018). In this paper, we also advocate for the stability
and good management of football clubs. Even if traditionally poorly managed clubs have often
found a benefactor, more solid decision making would prevent financial distress, improve the
capacity to generate resources to reinvest in the team, and eventually spare worries to the
club’s supporters. Particularly, in this paper we introduce analytic methods for supporting
transfer decisions.
In the research literature, (Pantuso, 2017) proposed a stochastic programming model with
the scope of maximizing the expected market value of the team. The findings of the study
confirm analytically the recipe provided by Kuper and Szymanski (2018): a steady growth
in the team value is associated with fewer transfers, timely selling old players (they are
often overrated), and investments in your prospects. However, in (Pantuso, 2017) players’
performance is not explicitly accounted for. While the strategy of maximizing the expected
market value of the team might benefit the club in the long-run, it may as well contrast with
the short-term requirement of meeting competitive goals. In fact, most managers are often
evaluated by matches won.
That not all football clubs act as profit maximizers has been mentioned in scientific lit-
erature on many occasions, starting with Sloane (1971) who suggested that European clubs
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behave as utility maximizers, with a utility function that contains other variables in addi-
tion to profit. Ke´senne (1996) introduced win maximization, with the consequence that clubs
should hire the best players within the limits of their budget. Rascher (1997) considered clubs
to maximize a linear combination of wins and the profit level, with different clubs having a
different weight to balance the two criteria. Ke´senne (2006) concluded that most clubs are
interested in more than making profit, but also that they do not want to win at any cost. This
in turn translates into the requirement of hiring top-performers who can immediately con-
tribute to on-field successes, but at the same time keeping an eye on the financial performance
of the club.
Measuring on-field performance means associating a numerical value to the contribution
given by the player to the team. This can been done using different methods (Szczepanski,
2015), one of which is the plus-minus rating. These initially consisted of recording the goals
scored minus the goals conceded from the perspective of each player, and were applied to ice
hockey players. Winston (2009) showed how the principle could be applied in basketball by
calculating adjusted plus-minus ratings, which are determined by multiple linear regression.
This allows the ratings to compensate for the teammates and opponents of each player. The
next important development was to use ridge regression instead of the method of ordinary
least squares to estimate the regression model, as proposed by Sill (2010) for basketball,
and later Macdonald (2012a) for ice hockey. This is sometimes known as regularized plus-
minus, and was adapted to association football by Sæbø and Hvattum (2015), with later
improvements by Sæbø and Hvattum (2019). Hvattum (2019) provided an overview of the
different developments made for plus-minus ratings, covering association football as well as
other team sports. One of the contributions of this paper is to present an improved regularized
plus-minus for association football, obtained by adding several novel features.
To account for both on-field and financial performances when composing a football team,
this paper provides a chance-constrained (Charnes and Cooper, 1959) mixed-integer optimiza-
tion model. The objective of the model is that of finding the mix of players with the highest
sum of individual player ratings. The selected mix of players must provide the skills required
by the coach. In addition, the total net expenditure in transfer fees must respect the given
budget. Finally, the future value of the players in the team must remain above a specified
threshold with a given probability. The latter condition is enforced by a chance constraint.
In contrast to (Pantuso, 2017) the model does not primarily maximize the market value of
the team, but rather a performance-based rating. The contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• A novel optimization problem which supports team composition decisions while account-
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ing both for the on-field and financial performance of the club.
• An improved player-rating system which significantly improves on state-of-the-art plus-
minus ratings for football players.
• An extensive computational study based on real transfer market data which highlights
the results achievable with the new optimization model and rating system, as well as the
differences between the solutions provided by our model and the solution to an existing
model from the literature. Furthermore, the case studies used in the computational
study are made available online at https://github.com/GioPan/instancesFTCP in
order to facilitate future research on the topic.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a more thorough description
of the problem and provide a mathematical formulation in the form of a chance-constrained
mixed-integer program. In Section 3 we introduce a novel plus-minus player-rating system.
In Section 4 we introduce and explain the case studies. In Section 5 we analyze the decisions
obtained with our model based on historical English Premier League data, and compare the
decisions to those obtained from the model provided by Pantuso (2017). Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
2 Problem Definition
The manager of a football club has to decide how to invest the available budget B to compose
a team of football players. Particularly, the manager’s decisions include which players to buy
or loan from other clubs, and which players to sell or loan out to other clubs. Let P be the set
of all players considered, both those currently in the team and those the club is considering
buying or loaning. Let parameter Yp be equal 1 if the player p belongs to the club at the
beginning of the planning horizon, 0 otherwise. The resulting team must be composed of a
fixed number of players, N , decided by (inter)national football associations. The club can
own more than N players. However, the players in excess cannot participate in competitions
and we assume they must be loaned out to other teams.
The players in the team must cover a set of roles R. In particular, let N r and N r be the
minimum and maximum number of players, respectively, in role r. A role is, in general, a
well defined set of technical and personal characteristics of the player, such as the position
on the field of play, the nationality, the speed, or strength. The players required in a given
role are typically decided by the coach when the role corresponds to a technical characteristic.
However, when the role defines a personal characteristic such as age or nationality, national
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or international regulations may specify how many players with those characteristics a club
may employ. As an example, clubs competing in the Italian Serie A may not employ more
than three non-EU citizens, and must employ at least four players trained in the academy of
an Italian club. Let Pr be the set of player having role r ∈ R. Notice that players might have
more than one role such that, in general,
⋂
r∈R Pr 6= ∅.
For each target player p the club is assumed to know the current purchase price V Pp and
loan fee V Bp . Similarly, for each player p currently in the team, the club knows the current
selling price V Sp and loan fee V
L
p . However, the future market value of the player is uncertain
and dependent on several unpredictable factors such as fitness, injuries and successes. Let
random variable V˜p represent the future market value of player p. We assume V˜p belongs to
a known probability space.
Let Wp be the rating of player p, corresponding to a measure of the on-field performance
of the player. The objective of the club is that of composing a team with the highest rating,
such that the size of the team is respected, the number of players in each role are respected,
the budget is not exceeded, and that the probability that the market value of the team exceeds
a threshold V is higher than α.
Let decision variable yp be equal to 1 if player p belongs to the club at the end of the focal
Transfer Market Window (TMW), and 0 otherwise. Variables yBp and y
S
p are equal to 1 if
player p is bought or sold during the TMW, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, variables
xLp and x
B
p are equal to 1 if player p is respectively leaving or arriving in a loan agreement
during the TMW, and 0 otherwise. The Football Team Composition Problem (FTCP) is thus
expressed by the following optimization problem.
max
∑
p∈P
Rp(yp + x
B
p − xL) (1a)
s.t. yp − yPp + ySp = Yp p ∈ P, (1b)∑
p∈P
(yp + x
B
p − xLp ) = N, (1c)∑
p∈Pr
(yp + x
B
p − xLp ) ≥ N r r ∈ R, (1d)∑
p∈Pr
(yp + x
B
p − xLp ) ≤ N r r ∈ R, (1e)
xBp + y
P
p ≤ 1− Yp p ∈ P, (1f)
xLp + y
S
p ≤ Yp p ∈ P, (1g)
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∑
p∈P
(
V Pp y
B
p + V
B
p x
B
p − V Sp ySp − V Lp xLp
) ≤ B, (1h)
P
(∑
p∈P
V˜pyp ≥ V
)
≥ α, (1i)
yp, y
P
p , y
S
p , x
B
p , x
L
p ∈ {0, 1} p ∈ P. (1j)
The objective function (1a) represents the performance of the team as described by the
sum of the ratings of the players competing for the team. Constraints (1b) ensure that a
player belongs to the team if he has been bought or if the player was in the team before the
opening of the TMW and has not been sold. Constraints (1c) ensure that the club registers
exactly N players for competitions, while constraints (1d) and (1e) ensure that each role is
covered by the necessary number of players. Constraints (1f) and (1g) ensure that a player
is loaned only if not owned, and sent on a loan only if owned, respectively. Constraints (1h)
ensure that expenses for obtaining players can be financed by players sold, players loaned out,
or a separate budget. Constraint (1i) ensures that the probability that the future value of
the team exceeds a threshold V (e.g., the current value of the team) is higher than α, with α
reflecting the financial risk attitude of the club. Finally, constraints (1j) set the domain for
the decision variables. In addition, similarly to Pantuso (2017), it is possible to fix the value
of a subset of the variables to indicate whether a player cannot be sold, bought, or moved on
loan.
3 Player Ratings
Multiple linear regression models, as used to calculate adjusted plus-minus ratings, are typi-
cally stated using y to denote the dependent variable, and yi being the value of the dependent
variable in observation i. A set V of independent variables, denoted by xj for j ∈ V and with
values xij for observation i, are assumed to be related to the dependent variable such that∑
j∈V
βjxij = yi + i
where βj are parameters describing the relationship between the independent variables and
the dependent variable, and i is an error term. When using ordinary least squares to estimate
the values of βi, one is essentially solving the following unconstrained quadratic program, with
n being the number of observations:
min
β

n∑
i=1
(
∑
j∈V
xijβj − yi)2

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For regularized plus-minus ratings, Tikhonov regularization is employed instead of ordi-
nary least squares, with a regularization coefficient λ, and the estimation can be performed
by solving the following unconstrained quadratic program:
min
β

n∑
i=1
(
∑
j∈V
xijβj − yi)2 +
∑
j∈V
(λβj)
2

In the context of plus-minus ratings for soccer players, let M be a set of matches. Each
match m ∈ M can be divided in a number of segments s ∈ Sm, where each player on the
pitch during the segment is playing for the whole segment. One possibility is to split into
segments for each substitution and for each time a player is sent off with a red card. For a
given segment, let fLHS(m, s) be the left hand side of a row in the regression model, and let
fRHS(m, s) be the right hand side. Let the regularization term for variable j be denoted by
fREG(βj). Furthermore, let w(m, s) be the importance of segment s ∈ Sm of match m ∈M,
allowing different segments to be weighted differently when estimating the parameters of the
model. Regularized plus-minus ratings can then be described by the following unconstrained
quadratic program:
minZ(β) =
∑
m∈M,s∈Sm
(
w(m, s)fLHS(m, s)− w(m, s)fRHS(m, s))2 +∑
j∈V
(
fREG(βj)
)2
which by specifying the details of fLHS , fRHS , fREG, and w(m, s), provides a specific variant
of adjusted plus-minus or regularized plus-minus ratings.
3.1 Regularized plus-minus ratings
To obtain a plain regularized plus-minus rating, define the following. Let h(m) and a(m) be
the two teams involved in match m, and let Pm,s,h and Pm,s,a be the sets of players involved
in segment s of match m for team h = h(m) and a = a(m), respectively. During segment s of
match m, the number of goals scored by team a and h is given by g(m, s, a) and g(m, s, h),
and the goal difference g(m, s) = g(m, s, h)−g(m, s, a) is measured in favor of the home team.
The duration of segment s of match m is d(m, s) minutes. Then define:
fLHS(m, s) =
d(m, s)
90
 ∑
p∈Pm,s,h
βp −
∑
p∈Pm,s,a
βp

fRHS(m, s) = g(m, s)
fREG(βj) = λβj
w(m, s) = 1
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The above regularized plus-minus rating does not take into account players sent off. Hence,
it seems fair to discard segments where any team does not have a full set of eleven players.
This can be done by a simple redefinition of Sm. A version of regularized plus-minus taking
into account red cards, home advantage, and the recency of observations was presented by
Sæbø and Hvattum (2019).
3.2 Novel regularized plus-minus ratings
The following describes a novel regularized plus-minus rating for football players, using an
improved method to model home field advantages, an improved method to take into account
red cards, and letting the ratings of players depend on their age. The method is also extended
in a new way to improve the handling of players appearing in different leagues or divisions, and
by introducing a more effective scheme for setting segment weights. The rating model aims
to explain the observation defined as fRHS(m, s) using variables and parameters expressed
as fLHS(m, s). The latter can be divided into 1) components that depend on the players p
involved in the segment, fPLAY ER(m, s, p), 2) components that depend on the segment s but
not the players, fSEGMENT (m, s), and 3) components that depend on the match m, but not
the segment, fMATCH(m). Thus we can write:
90
d(m, s)
fLHS(m, s) =
∑
p∈Pm,s,h
fPLAY ER(m, s, p)
−
∑
p∈Pm,s,a
fPLAY ER(m, s, p)
+ fSEGMENT (m, s)
+ fMATCH(m)
where setting fSEGMENT (m, s) = fMATCH(m) = 0 and fPLAY ER(m, s, p) = βp gives the
plain regularized plus-minus as defined earlier.
The home field advantage may vary between different league systems. For example, since
the home field advantage is measured in terms of the goal difference per 90 minutes, it may
be that the advantage is different in high scoring and low scoring tournaments. Let c(m) be
the country or competition type in which match m takes place. Home field advantage is then
modelled by setting
fMATCH(m) =
{
βHc(m) if team h(m) has home advantage
0 otherwise
To correctly include the effect of players being sent off after red cards, the average rating of
the players left on the pitch is used as the baseline to which additional variables corresponding
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to the effect of red cards on the expected goal differences are added. To this end, fLHS is
first redefined as follows:
90
d(m, s)
fLHS(m, s) =
11
|Pm,s,h|
∑
p∈Pm,s,h
fPLAY ER(m, s, p)
− 11|Pm,s,a|
∑
p∈Pm,s,a
fPLAY ER(m, s, p)
+ fSEGMENT (m, s)
+ fMATCH(m)
Now, define r(m, s, n) = 1 if team h has received n red cards and team a has not,
r(m, s, n) = −1 if team a has received n red cards and team h has not, and r(m, s, n) = 0
otherwise. Then, red card variables are introduced, where a difference is made between the
value of a red card for the home team and for the away team, by rewriting fSEGMENT (m, s)
as:
fSEGMENT (m, s) =
4∑
n=1
r(m, s, n)βHOMEREDn , if
4∑
n=1
r(m, s, 1) ≥ 0
fSEGMENT (m, s) =
4∑
n=1
r(m, s, n)βAWAY REDn , if
4∑
n=1
r(m, s, 1) < 0
Playing strength is not constant throughout a player’s career. In particular, being too
young and inexperienced or too old and physically deteriorated, may both be seen as disad-
vantageous. In a paper devoted to studying the peak age of football players, Dendir (2016)
took performance ratings as given (calculated by a popular web page for football statistics),
and fit different models to estimate the age effects. In that study, the peak age of players was
estimated to between 25 and 27 years, depending on the position of the players.
To include an age effect, the player rating component of the model, fPLAY ER(m, s, p),
is modified. Let t = t(m) denote the time when match m is played, and let T denote the
time that the ratings are calculated. Let t(m, p) be the age of player p at time t(m). The
ages of players, t(m, p), are measured in years. In addition to considering quadratic and
cubic functions to describe the effect of a player’s age, Dendir (2016) introduced separate
dummy variables for each age, year by year. In the regularized plus-minus model, this can
be mimicked by representing the age effect as a piecewise linear function. To accomplish
this, define a set of ages, Y = {ymin, ymin + 1, . . . , ymax}. For a given match m and player
p, let max{min{t(m, p), ymax}, ymin} = ∑y∈Y u(y, t(m), p)y, where ∑y∈Y u(y, t(m), p) = 1,
0 ≤ u(y, t(m), p) ≤ 1, at most two values u(y, t(m), p) are non-zero, and if there are two
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non-zero values u(y, t(m), p) they are for consecutive values of y. The player component can
then be stated as:
fPLAY ER(m, s, p) =βp +
∑
y∈Y
u(y, t(m), p)βAGEy
If all players in a match have the exact same age, the age variables cancel out. However,
when players are of different age, the corresponding effects of the age difference can be esti-
mated. As a result, players are not assumed to have a constant rating over the entire time
horizon of the data set, but are instead assumed to have a rating that follows an estimated
age curve.
The regularization terms are not strictly necessary for variables other than the player
rating variables, βp. However, for smaller data sets, it seems beneficial to include the regular-
ization terms also for additional variables, such as for the home field advantage and the red
card effects. For the age variables, βAGEy , a different scheme is chosen, as it seems beneficial to
make sure that the estimates for each age are somehow smoothed. This can be accomplished
by the following replacements for the regularization terms:
fREG(βAGEy ) = λ
(
βAGEy − (βAGEy−1 + βAGEy+1 )/2
)
, y ∈ Y \ {ymin, ymax}
fREG(βAGEy ) = 0, y ∈ {ymin, ymax}
For players with few minutes of recorded playing time, the standard regularization ensures
that the players’ ratings are close to zero. Sæbø and Hvattum (2019) included a tournament
factor in the player ratings, thus allowing players making their debut in a high level league to
obtain a higher rating than players making their debut in low level leagues. This tournament
factor is generalized here, as follows. Let B be a set of different leagues, and let Bp ⊆ B be
the set of leagues in which player p has participated. The player component is then further
refined to become
fPLAY ER(m, s, p) =βp +
∑
y∈Y
u(y, t(m), p)βAGEy +
1
|Bp|
∑
b∈Bp
βBb
This helps to discriminate players from different leagues. However, a further refinement of
this is achieved by modifying the regularization terms. Instead of always shrinking a player’s
individual rating component βp towards 0, as in the plain regularized plus-minus ratings,
the whole expression providing the current rating of a player is shrunk towards a value that
depends on a set of similar players. Let PSIMILARp be a set of players that are assumed to
be similar to player p. In this work, the set is established by using the teammates of p that
have been on the pitch together with p for the highest number of minutes. Let t(p, p′) be the
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time of the last match where players p and p′ appeared on the pitch for the same team. Now,
define the following auxiliary expression, where wAGE is a weight for the influence of the age
factor:
fAUX(p, t, wAGE) =βp + w
AGE
∑
y∈Y
u(y, t, p)βAGEy +
1
|Bp|
∑
b∈Bp
βBb
The rating of player p at time T is then equal to fAUX(p, T, 1), and it is this value that
will be shrunk towards a value that depends on the teammates of p, rather than towards 0.
To this end, the regularization term for player p is replaced by the following:
fREG(βp) = λ
fAUX(p, T, 1)− wSIMILAR|PSIMILARp |
 ∑
p′∈PSIMILARp
fAUX(p′, t(p, p′), wAGE)

where wSIMILAR ≤ 1 is another weight that controls the emphasis of shrinking the rating of
player p towards the rating of similar players versus shrinking towards 0.
The model estimation is performed by minimizing the sum of squared deviations between
observed goal differences and a linear expression of player ratings and additional factors. The
sum is taken over all segments from all matches included in the data. However, not all of
these segments are equally informative, and better ratings can be obtained by changing the
relative weight w(m, s) of different segments.
The weights used here have three components. The first component emphasizes that more
recent matches are more representative for the current strength of players. Hence, a factor
wTIME(m) = eρ1(T−t(m)) is included, which leads to smaller weights for older matches. The
second component focuses on the duration of a segment, with longer segments being more
important than shorter segments. Given two parameters ρ2 and ρ3, and the duration of a
segment, d(m, s), a factor on the form wDURATION (m, s) = (d(m, s) + ρ2)/ρ3 is included.
The third component takes into account the goal difference at the beginning of the segment,
g0(m, s), as well as the goal difference at the end of the segment, g1(m, s) = g0(m, s) +
g(m, s), introducing the factor wGOALS(m, s) = ρ4 if |g0(m, s)| ≥ 2 and |g1(m, s)| ≥ 2, and
wGOALS(m, s) = 1 otherwise. The weight of a segment can then be stated as:
w(m, s) = wTIME(m, s)wDURATION (m, s)wGOALS(m, s).
4 Case Studies
In this section we describe a number of case studies used to test model (1). The case studies
consist of the 20 clubs competing in the English Premier League (EPL) during the 2013/14
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season. Each club is characterized by the current team composition and a list of target
players, and we use model (1) to address the transfer market of summer 2014, in preparation
for season 2014/15. The data of the case studies is made available online at https://github.
com/GioPan/instancesFTCP.
In Section 4.1 we describe the clubs and their current and target players. In Section 4.2
we introduce a model of the market value of the player which allows us to obtain an empirical
probability distribution. Given the complexity of solving model (1) with the original empirical
distribution, in Section 4.3 we introduce its Sample Average Approximation. In Section 4.4 we
provide some statistics about the ratings of the players in the case studies. The case studies
are subsequently used to perform a number of tests which will be thoroughly described in
Section 5.
4.1 Clubs and players
The case studies used for testing are adapted from those introduced by Pantuso (2017) based
the English Premier League (EPL). The case studies describe the 20 teams in the EPL
2013/2014 dealing with the summer 2014 transfer market. Each team is characterized by
a budget, a set of players currently owned and the set of target players. Given a focal team
among the 20 available, the set P consists of the set of current player and the set of target
players. Each player is characterized by age, role, current value, purchase and sale price, loan
fees, and whether the player can be purchased, sold, or temporarily change club in a loan
agreement.
In addition to the above mentioned data, we set N = 25 in accordance with EPL rules.
Furthermore, we test different formations, where a formation determines the number of players
required for each role. Thus, for each role r ∈ R we set N r according to Table 1, and N r =∞.
Finally, we set V equal to the initial market value of the team (i.e., the club wishes to ensure
a non-decreasing value of the team) and we use a 7% discount factor. Uncertain values and
ratings are discussed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.4, respectively.
4.2 Modeling the Uncertainty
Uncertain future player values are modeled using a linear regression model. The parameters
of the model are estimated using English Premier League data for the seasons 2011/2012
through 2016/2017. Consistently with Pantuso (2017) we use the current value of the player
and its role as explanatory variables and the value after one season as the dependent variable.
Unlike in Pantuso (2017), different regression models are used for different age intervals, as
this allows us to capture the higher volatility in the value of younger players. For each player
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Table 1: Formations and players required in each role (Nr).
r ∈ R
Formation GK RB CB LB RW CM LW AM FW
442 3 2 4 2 2 4 2 0 4
433 3 2 4 2 0 6 0 0 6
4312 3 2 4 2 0 6 0 2 4
352 3 0 6 0 2 6 2 0 4
343 3 0 6 0 2 4 2 0 6
p ∈ P, and scenario s ∈ S, the future value Vps is thus obtained as
Vps =
(
αa
4
√
V Cp +
∑
r∈R
βarδ(p,Pr)
)4
∗ (1 + as) (2)
where V Cp is the current value of player p, δ(p,Pr) is an indicator function of the membership
of player p in Pr, i.e., it is equal to 1 if player p has role r, 0 otherwise, and as is an
i.i.d. sample from the empirical prediction error distribution of the regression model for the
specific age group. Notice also that αa, βar and a are estimated for different age intervals
a ∈ {(·, 20], [21, 22], [23, 24], [25, 26], [27, 28], [29, 30], [31, 32], [33, ·)}.
4.3 Sample Average Approximation
The empirical prediction error distribution for regression model (2) is a discrete distribution
with a very large support. This makes model (1) a mixed-integer linear program. However,
solving the model using directly the original discrete distribution is impractical due to the
large number of realizations of the player values. Therefore, we solve its Sample Average
Approximation (SAA), see e.g., Kleywegt et al. (2002); Shapiro (2003); Pagnoncelli et al.
(2009).
Let S = {1, . . . , S} and let (Vps)s∈S be an |S|-dimensional i.i.d. sample of V˜p for all p ∈ P.
Furthermore, for all s ∈ S let ws be a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the team value
exceeds the threshold V under scenario s, 0 otherwise. That is ws = 1 =⇒
∑
p∈P Vpsyp ≥ V .
Constraint (1i) can be approximated by constraints (3)-(5)∑
p∈P
Vpsyp +M(1− ws) ≥ V s ∈ S (3)
∑
s∈S
1
|S|ws ≥ α (4)
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ws ∈ {0, 1} s ∈ S (5)
where M is a suitable upper bound to V −∑p∈P Vpsyp. The quantity V −∑p∈P Vpsyp is
bounded above by M = V , achieved when
∑
p∈P Vpsyp = 0 (which yields and infeasible
solution).
We approximate the original empirical distribution by means of 70 i.i.d. samples. Numer-
ical tests showed that this number of samples ensures both in-sample stability of the objective
function (i.e., a negligible standard deviation of the SAA optimal objective value across dif-
ferent sets of samples) and out-of-sample satisfaction of the chance constraint, assessed on a
sample of 500 scenarios.
When solving the multistage stochastic program introduced by Pantuso (2017), scenario
trees are also sampled from the empirical prediction error distribution based on regression
model (2). Consistently with Pantuso (2017) we draw 18 conditional samples per stage, as
this number of conditional samples ensures stable in-sample results.
4.4 Ratings
The player ratings used in this study are calculated using the model outlined in Section 3.2.
Data from more than 84,000 matches to be used in the calculations were collected from online
sources. The matches come from national leagues of 25 different countries, as well as from
international tournaments for club teams and national teams, and the ratings are calculated
as of July 1 2014. Table 2 shows the ten highest ranked players at that time.
Table 2: Ten highest ranked players at July 1 2014.
Rank Player Age Position Nationality Team Rating
1 Cristiano Ronaldo 29 FW Portugal Real Madrid 0.317
2 Gae¨l Clichy 28 LB France Manchester City 0.296
3 Lionel Messi 27 FW Argentina Barcelona 0.286
4 Karim Benzema 26 FW France Real Madrid 0.286
5 Thomas Mu¨ller 24 FW Germany Bayern Mu¨nchen 0.281
6 Mesut O¨zil 25 AM Germany Arsenal 0.277
7 Arjen Robben 30 FW Netherlands Bayern Mu¨nchen 0.270
8 Je´roˆme Boateng 25 LB Germany Bayern Mu¨nchen 0.270
9 Cesc Fa`bregas 27 CM Spain Barcelona 0.269
10 Marcelo 26 RB Brazil Real Madrid 0.267
14
age
rating
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Relative age effect
Figure 1: The effect of age on player ratings, as estimated by the rating model.
Parameter values for the rating calculations were determined using a different data set,
containing more recent results but much fewer leagues. Using an ordered logit regression
model to predict match results based on the difference in average player ratings for the two
teams involved, parameters were set to minimize the quadratic loss of predictions from out-
of-sample matches. This resulted in the following parameter values. The age variables are
defined for Y = {ymin = 16, . . . , ymax = 42}. Observations are discounted over time with a
factor of ρ1 = 0.1, and are weighted using ρ2 = 300.0, ρ3 = 300.0, and ρ4 = 2.5. The general
regularization parameter is λ = 16.0, and to make sure each player is assumed to be somewhat
similar to the most common teammates, we end up with wSIMILAR = 0.85, wAGE = 0.35,
and with the maximum number of teammates considered being 35 (for |PSIMILARp |).
Figure 1 shows how the rating model is estimating the effect of a player’s age on his
performance. As in (Dendir, 2016), it is found that the peak age is around 25–27 years.
There are few observations with players aged above 40 years, and in combination with a
survival bias, the estimated age curve is unreliable for relatively old players.
The rating model also provides estimates for the value of the home field advantage and the
effect of red cards. The home field advantage is allowed to vary between countries, and the
average effect corresponds to 0.25 goals per 90 minutes. The home field advantage is highest
in the Champions League and the Europa League, with 0.41 goals per 90 minutes. The values
of red cards differ between home teams and away teams in the rating model. The first red
card is worth more when the away team has a player sent off. In that case, the advantage for
the home team is 1.07 goals per 90 minutes, whereas the effect is 0.83 goals per 90 minutes
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when the home team is reduced by one man. As in (Sæbø and Hvattum, 2019), it is found
that subsequent red cards have smaller consequences.
5 Results and discussion
In this section we present the results of a number of tests performed on the case studies
based on the EPL 2013/14. The scope of the tests is to illustrate the team composition
strategies obtainable with model (1), and particularly compare those with the strategies of
a club that maximizes the team value. A team value-maximizer is modeled by means of the
multistage stochastic program from Pantuso (2017). Furthermore, we assess the impact of
different financial risk tolerances of the clubs. Unless otherwise specified we show the results
obtained using a 4-4-3 formation. In Appendix A we show that our findings are to a large
extent insensitive to the formation chosen. In what follows, we refer to the chance constrained
model (1) as CC and to the multistage stochastic program from Pantuso (2017) as MSP.
5.1 Maximizing team value vs maximizing ratings
The solutions to the CC model are compared to those obtained by solving the MSP model.
This corresponds to comparing the maximization of the ratings (subject to probabilistic con-
straints on the market value) to the maximization of market values regardless of player ratings.
For the MSP model we consider three stages and generate 18 conditional realizations at each
stage as in (Pantuso, 2017), resulting in 324 scenarios (see Section 4.3 for details on the
scenario generation).
Figure 2 compares the total rating of the teams composed by the MSP model and by the
CC model with different values of α. The rating of the team obtained by the CC model is
consistently higher than the rating of the MSP, and in most cases significantly higher. The
MSP model does not find any value in signing top performers per se. Rather, the MSP model
looks for players whose value is likely to increase in the future as a consequence of their
age, role, and current evaluation. Very often, these players are not yet top performers. On
the other hand, the CC model looks primarily for top rated players, that is players whose
performances have provided a solid contribution to their respective team’s victories in past
matches. For several teams the rating is insensitive to the value of α. This issue is properly
discussed in Section 5.2.
Let us now turn our attention to the expected market value of the two teams after one
season. In Figure 3 we can observe that, for most teams, the MSP model yields a significantly
higher expected team value after one season. This is to be expected since the MSP maximizes
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Figure 2: Total rating of the team composed by the MSP and by the CC model with different
levels of α.
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market values. On the other hand, the CC model simply ensures that the market value of
the team does not decrease after one season. Thus, the decision maker does not seek a return
on the capital employed in the team, but simply wants to ensure that the investment keeps
its value. In Figure 3 we can also find a number of teams for which the CC model provides a
higher one-year expected team value than the MSP model. This is due to the fact that the
MSP model maximizes the average expected team value over a three-year period. Therefore,
it is possible that the model suggests investments that do not necessarily yield the highest
team value after one season, as long as the average over three seasons is maximized.
5.2 Team rating and risk tolerance
We illustrate the impact of the risk tolerance α on team ratings. We consider both the
standard case in which the club wants to ensure a non-decreasing team value, and the case
in which the club wants to ensure a growth of the value of the team of either 10, 20, or 30%.
This corresponds to multiplying the constant V by a factor R = 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, respectively,
in constraint (1i). In the default case, V represents the initial market value of the team.
Figure 4 shows an intuitive general trend: as α increases the total team rating tends
to decrease. As α increases we impose a higher probability of satisfying a purely financial
measure. Consequently, the club has less freedom to sign top-performers, and is bound to
find players that ensure a sufficient growth of the team value. Small α values represent clubs
that are primarily interested in the here-and-now performance, and less concerned about the
financial aspects. In this case, the decision maker has more freedom to choose top performers.
For a number of clubs, pursuing a team value growth is incompatible with ensuring top-
performers to the team. However, a few clubs are rather insensitive to α, especially for low
values of R. In the latter case, the players that ensure the highest rating are, in general,
the same player that ensure financial goals are met with sufficiently high probability. This is
indeed a favorable situation, and it depends on the initial composition of the team as well as
on the list of targets, and thus on the players available on the market. Notice, for example
how Chelsea FC, Manchester City, and Manchester United show a similar high sensitivity
to α as they share, in our case studies, the same list of target players. The same applies to
Liverpool FC, Newcastle United, and Everton FC.
Let us zoom in on the case of Chelsea FC as a representative case for the clubs that are
most sensitive to the probability α. Figure 5 reports the rating and the expected market
value increase for the suggested transfers with α = 0.2 and α = 0.8 (assuming R = 1.2).
With α = 0.2 the club keeps most of the high-rating players, loans out most of the player
with high expected growth that are not yet top performers, and sells some top performers
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Figure 4: Total rating of the resulting team for different degrees of risk tolerance α and for
different values of R.
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Figure 5: Distribution of transfers of Chelsea FC α = 0.2 and 0.8, and R = 1.2. EVI
represents the Expected Value Increase of a player, and is calculated as the expectation of
(future value-current value)/current value.
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with low expected value increase. On the other hand, when α = 0.8 the club will keep
more of the high-expected-growth players and sell most of the high-rating players with low
expected growth. Regarding inbound transfers, when α = 0.2 the club tends to buy, or sign
on a loan agreement, players with above-average rating, and relatively low expected growth.
However, with α = 0.8 the club signs the players with the highest expected value increase and
fewer players with high ratings. That is, as the club becomes more concerned with financial
stability, it will tend to build a team of high-potential players in spite of a reduced here-
and-now performance. However, when the club is less concerned about finances, it will tend
to keep its top performers and sign new high-rating players, in spite of the limited expected
market value growth.
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Figure 6: Average purchase age for different values of α and R.
As the requirement of meeting financial goals becomes stricter, the model suggests that
Chelsea FC should buy younger player and sells older players, as illustrated in Table 3. The
market value of younger players is, in general, expected to grow more than that of older players.
Consequently, the model will tend to discard players that do not contribute to fulfilling the
22
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Arsenal-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Aston-Villa
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Cardiff-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Chelsea-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Crystal-Palace
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Everton-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Fulham-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Hull-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Liverpool-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Manchester-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Manchester-United
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Newcastle-United
R
0%
10%
20%
30%
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Norwich-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Southampton-FC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Stoke-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Sunderland-AFC
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Swansea-City
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
Tottenham-Hotspur
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
West-Bromwich-Albion
0.2 0.5 0.9
20
30
West-Ham-United
Av
g 
Sa
le
s A
ge
Figure 7: Average sales age for different values of α and R.
financial constraints. The insight we obtain from the solution for Chelsea FC is consistent
with a more general trend that sees the average purchase age decrease with α, and the average
sales age increase with α. These trends, illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7, are however
erratic as purchases and sales need to generate a team composition feasible with respect not
only to the chance constraints, but also to the other constraints of the problem.
Table 3: Average age for the solution of Chelsea FC for α = 0.2 and 0.8 and R = 1.2.
α Purchases Hired on a loan agreement Sales Sent on a loan agreement
0.2 26.0 28.0 28.2 20.6
0.8 24.3 – 30.7 23.0
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Figure 8: Number of players hired on a loan agreement for different budgets and values of R.
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5.3 Loaning strategies
Hiring players on a loan agreement is a typical strategy for mid- and low-tier clubs to ensure
a team of acceptable quality with a low budget to spend on the market. On the other hand,
top clubs tend to purchase the players they need, very often due to more generous budgets.
As shown in Figure 8, the results obtained with model (1) are consistent with this general
trend. The clubs that hire most players on a loan agreement are those with smaller budgets.
6 Conclusions
This article introduced a chance-constrained optimization model for assisting football clubs
during transfer market decision. Furthermore it presented a new rating system which is able
to measure numerically the on-field performance of football players. Such measure is necessary
in order to arrive at an objective assessment of football players and thus limit the bias in the
observers.
The model and rating system have been extensively tested on case-studies based on real-
life English Premier League marked data. The results illustrate that the model is able to
mimic the reasoning of a club’s decision maker when dealing with transfers of professional
players. Furthermore, the analytic support provided can adapt to different levels of financial
concern and thus to support football decision makers with tailor-made analytic suggestions.
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A Sensitivity to the formation
Figure 9 illustrates that solutions to model (1) are not sensitive to the formation, and thus
the discussion in Section 5 holds independently of the formation chosen.
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Figure 9: Total team rating for different values of α and for different formations with R = 1.0.
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